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Coordinating competing interests can be difficult. Because law regulates 
human behavior, it is a candidate mechanism for creating coordination in 
the face of societal disagreement. We argue that findings from moral psy-
chology are necessary to understand why law can effectively resolve co-
occurring conflicts related to punishment and group membership. First, we 
discuss heterogeneity in punitive thought, focusing on punishment within 
the United States legal system. Though the law exerts a weak influence on 
punitive ideologies before punishment occurs, we argue that it effectively 
coordinates perceptions of individuals who have already been punished. 
Next, we discuss intergroup conflict, which often co-occurs with disagree-
ments related to punishment and represents a related domain where coor-
dination can be difficult to achieve. Here, we underscore how insights 
from moral psychology can promote equality via the law. These examples 
demonstrate how contributions from moral psychology are necessary to 
understand the connection between social cognition and law. 
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On January 1, 1863, Abraham Lincoln proclaimed freedom for “all persons held as 
slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be 
in rebellion against the United States.” Because this proclamation lacked legal standing 
in the rebellious states, legal freedom did not come until the ratification of the thir-
teenth amendment in April 1864. Even then, many fought the establishment of provi-
sions to punish members of one group for attempting to own members of another. One 
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version of the thirteenth amendment, proposed by Senator Charles Sumner, read that 
“all persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave”—
but this was too radical for most other members of Congress. The final version made 
no mention of equality under the law but did state that involuntary servitude was 
legal as punishment for a crime. Several states from the former confederacy ratified 
this version only after issuing notices that their ratification did not grant the federal 
government the right to create legislation regarding the standing of formerly enslaved 
people (i.e., according to these states, the federal government could not punish Whites 
for attempting to continue slavery; Tsesis, 2004). More than 150 years later, the full 
dream embodied in Sumner’s proposed amendment remains to be fulfilled, but at least 
most United States (US) residents no longer voice open support for human bondage.   
The controversy around appropriate consequences for people who try to own their 
fellow human beings illustrates a broader theme concerning moral cognition. Namely, 
punishment often elicits controversy, particularly in contexts where the people who 
receive harm and the people who perpetuate harm belong to different social groups. 
People often disagree about whether such punishment should exist at all and, if so, 
who should receive the punishment and how severe it should be. Such disagreement 
is often demarcated by group membership. With regard to civil rights, for instance, 
White support lags far behind that of Black people (McRae, 2018; Sokol, 2008). 
Such disagreements can present a coordination problem. Here, we join other schol-
ars in conceptualizing a “coordination problem” as the kind of issue that arises when 
actors experience conflict over what outcome is most desirable  (McAdams & Nadler, 
2005, 2008). Such disputes are commonplace in everyday life. For example, two indi-
viduals may wish to have a relaxing afternoon in the same public park; however, one 
of them wants to relax by quietly reading a book, while the other wants to play loud 
rock-and-roll music for all to hear. Or, perhaps more consequentially, two people 
may desire to introduce policies for penal reform. While one wants to increase the 
length of time people spend in prisons, the other wants to abolish prisons altogether. 
In other words, under this conceptualization of a coordination problem, the problem 
arises when people have competing interests. This differs somewhat from a situation 
in which independent actors make choices that directly impact one another and have 
entirely compatible interests, such as separately deciding where to meet the others for 
dinner. 
If people disagree about appropriate punishment, how can US society as a whole 
determine what should happen to people who transgress? Put slightly differently, how 
can US society coordinate views about people who transgress? Several scholars have 
proposed that one function of the law is to facilitate coordination and cooperation 
among individuals even when they disagree (McAdams, 2015; McAdams & Nadler, 
2005, 2008; Nadler, 2017). We build on this model by arguing that the law (here, we 
focus particularly on US law) is able to do so because it has the power to communicate 
moral norms, which can, in turn, coordinate moral cognition and behavior. 
The central argument of this article is as follows: Because the law can shape people’s 
moral understanding and behavior, it is equipped to resolve coordination issues that 
are embedded in systems of social cognition. In this way, law can be likened to an 
arm and its moral influence can be likened to muscle. Without muscle, an arm is just 
a fleshy appendage, limp and weak. Analogously, without the ability to communicate 
moral messages and shape moral norms, the law would not have enough strength 
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to coordinate human cognition or behavior; it would have no muscle. Thus, findings 
from moral psychology—the science of people’s morally relevant cognition, behavior, 
and affect—are necessary in order to understand how this coordination occurs. 
For two main reasons, we focus on coordination in the contexts of punishment 
and intergroup relations. First, these areas often elicit controversy that the law must 
navigate. Second, these areas underscore the idea that coordination can result in both 
negative and positive consequences. Within the domain of punishment, coordination 
can impede justice by propagating the view that people who have received legal pun-
ishment are irredeemably bad people. This is an example of “negative coordination.” 
However, within the domain of intergroup relations, coordination can promote justice 
by establishing greater equality among groups. This is an example of “positive coor-
dination.” In both types of cases, understanding moral cognition and behavior is nec-
essary in order to understand why the law is able to coordinate at all, whether justly 
or unjustly. Thus, the sections below discuss how scientific knowledge of morality 
is a necessary bridge connecting social cognition (e.g., coordination among different 
people’s judgments) and law.
A CASE OF “NEGATIVE COORDINATION”:  
LAW COORDINATES PEOPLE’S VIEWS ABOUT PUNISHMENT
We begin by reviewing evidence suggesting that views about punishment can be het-
erogeneous and clarifying how such heterogeneity can lead to disagreement. Our cen-
tral claim here is that the law is particularly well suited to help coordinate ideas about 
punishment because it can communicate who deserves moral condemnation. In turn, 
these moral messages effectively coordinate people’s responses to punishment, includ-
ing their views toward people who have already received punishment. While coordi-
nating views about punishment helps alleviate disagreement (which may be viewed 
as an ostensibly positive outcome), coordination within this domain has profoundly 
negative consequences for those whom the law seeks to punish. In this way, coordi-
nation within the domain of punishment has net negative consequences because it 
stymies justice.
HETEROGENEITY IN PUNITIVE IDEOLOGY AS  
AN EXAMPLE OF NON-COORDINATION 
The desire to punish emerges early in life and persists across development (e.g., Alicke, 
1992; Bregant, Wellbery, & Shaw, 2019; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; 
Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011; Heiphetz & Young, 2014; Kurzban, DeScioli, 
& O’Brien, 2007; Nadler, 2012; Nadler & McDonnell, 2011; Vaish, Missana, & Toma-
sello, 2011; Yucel & Vaish, 2018; Yudkin, Van Bavel, & Rhodes, 2019). Although nearly 
all humans make judgments about punishment, some views may vary across different 
people and groups of people. Of particular relevance to the legal system, Black and 
White individuals may hold different views regarding appropriate punishment for 
legal violations (Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Forman, 2017; Weaver, 2007). Such disagree-
ments may emerge in part because the US legal system metes out punishment incon-
sistently and disproportionately punishes people who are marginalized on the basis 
of racial group membership (e.g., Alexander, 2012; Forman, 2017; Harcourt, 2007). 
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Compared to their White peers, Black and Latinx people are more likely to experience 
police surveillance (e.g., Harcourt, 2007) and police use of force (e.g., Trinkner, Kerri-
son, & Goff, 2019; Weitzer, 2015). Of course, disagreements about punishment are not 
solely demarcated by racial group membership and may also emerge between other 
social groups (e.g., groups identifying with different political parties).  
Such non-coordination regarding views of punishment can be detrimental. Accord-
ing to models of procedural justice, punishments delivered by the legal system are 
perceived as more legitimate when they are perceived as fair (Tyler & Huo, 2002). If 
a person’s likelihood of being sentenced to particular punishments depends on who 
is deciding which punishment to deliver, rather than depending solely on the trans-
gression that was committed, the system that delivers these punishments can be per-
ceived as capricious and, therefore, unfair. When people view punishment as unfair, 
they may be less likely to follow the norms that the legal system tries to establish 
(Tyler, 2006). In other words, non-coordination regarding views of punishment may 
predict non- coordination regarding legally relevant behaviors, such as following the 
law, an ostensibly undesirable outcome. Though non-coordination in and of itself may 
be undesirable for those who seek to mete out punishment, coordination within this 
domain is extraordinarily costly for those who receive punishment. We elaborate on the 
net negative consequences of coordination within the domain of punishment below. 
By integrating research demonstrating that (a) ideas about punishment vary across 
people and (b) punishment must be coordinated in order to be beneficial, it may 
seem that social cognition (i.e., processes that create different judgments regarding 
punishment) creates situations ripe for failure. Indeed, such situations can highlight 
the importance of coordination, as the US legal system could be perceived as more 
legitimate — and could potentially regulate human behavior even more effectively 
than it currently does—if views regarding who deserves punishment and what type 
of punishment they should receive were better coordinated (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 
2002). Below, we argue that—despite our social cognition — coordination within the 
legal domain does indeed occur. More specifically, we argue that such coordination 
comes about after legal punishment is delivered and has negative consequences for 
punished individuals.  
COORDINATION IN THE DOMAIN OF PUNISHMENT:  
THE LAW COORDINATES THE VIEW THAT PUNISHED  
INDIVIDUALS ARE IRREDEEMABLY IMMORAL
Though the law may not strongly coordinate punitive ideologies before punishment 
decisions are made, stronger coordination emerges after punishment occurs. Below, 
we review evidence that the law can signal information about who deserves moral 
condemnation and punishment. We then draw on past work showing that laws can 
communicate information about consensus to argue that the moral messages commu-
nicated by laws coordinate people’s views about punishment (e.g., how to view people 
who have received punishment). Thus, within the domain of punishment, the coordi-
nating power of current laws within the US context lies not in shaping views concern-
ing what type of punishment people should receive, but in coordinating people’s views 
of those who have already received punishment. 
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In the United States, laws coordinate public perceptions in part by communicating 
negative information about those who have received punishment via the legal system 
(e.g., Alexander, 2012; Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2020; Kleinfeld, 2016; Yankah, 2004; also see 
Bilz, 2016; Bregant, Shaw, & Kinzler, 2016; Ho, Cushman, Littman, & Austerweil, 2019, 
for evidence that punishment is communicative). Consider the widely implemented 
“three strikes” laws, which stipulate that a third felony conviction warrants a lengthy 
sentence (Meese, 1994). Such laws, among others, communicate that people who have 
committed crimes are not just people who have done bad things but are themselves 
irredeemably bad (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2020; Kleinfeld, 2016; Yankah, 2004). 
Humans are especially attentive to messages with morally relevant content (Brady, 
Gantman, & Van Bavel, 2020). People attend to messages communicated by the law 
(e.g., Bilz, 2016) and perceive information conveyed by the law to reflect predominant 
social norms (McAdams, 2015; Nadler, 2017; Tankard & Paluck, 2016, 2017). To illus-
trate this point, consider a hypothetical new law that restricts the rights of formerly 
incarcerated individuals. Given its content, this law may communicate something 
negative about incarcerated people (e.g., that they deserve punishment but not free-
dom; Yankah, 2004). Further, this law can communicate that, in general, other commu-
nity members endorse this view (e.g., a majority of others also agree that incarcerated 
people do not deserve freedom; Tankard & Paluck, 2017). If a particular community 
member already endorses such a position, this new law may lead that individual to 
think that others favor it as well, which could subsequently reinforce the strength of 
this preexisting view (Nadler, 2017). Even if a particular individual does not already 
endorse such a view, perceptions of normativity may instantiate change. Indeed, con-
verging lines of evidence from social cognition and behavioral economics suggest that 
people often change their behavioral intentions (e.g., Gerber & Rogers, 2009) as well as 
their actual behaviors (e.g., Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; 
Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Krupka & Weber, 2013) to conform to norms they perceive to be 
commonly held. But why might changes in descriptive norms—that is, perceptions of 
how other people think and behave—lead people to change their behaviors? Insights 
from moral psychology are needed to help answer this question. 
Some theoretical proposals suggest that people incorporate information about both 
descriptive and moral norms when making judgments (e.g., when evaluating what is 
normal; Bear & Knobe, 2017; Wysocki, 2020) and that, in turn, such judgments influ-
ence may influence people’s behaviors (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990). This work suggests 
that people distinctly represent descriptive and moral norms when making certain 
types of judgments (e.g., normality). However, other programs of research find that 
the perceived boundary between descriptive and moral norms may be blurry at times. 
This research suggests that people may glean moral norms (how people should behave) 
from descriptive norms (how people do behave; Goldring & Heiphetz, 2020; Lindström, 
Jangard, Selbing, & Olsson, 2018; Roberts, Guo, Ho, & Gelman, 2018). That is, people 
infer that what is common is also moral. For example, when people perceive that a 
particular view (e.g., incarcerated people are intrinsically bad and should be punished) 
is becoming even more normative than it currently is, they may believe that holding 
such a view is morally “good” or “right.” People are highly motivated to be seen as 
moral (for a review, see Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov, & van Leeuwen, 2019). There-
fore, they may be especially willing to behave concordantly with perceived descriptive 
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norms (e.g., supporting punitive outcomes; Son, Bhandari, & FeldmanHall, 2019; Tan-
kard & Paluck, 2016).  
Thus, our proposal is that laws communicate moral messages (e.g., about the moral 
character of incarcerated people) and that such messages tell people what others in the 
community collectively think about a given topic (e.g., punishment). That is, such mes-
sages announce descriptive norms. People sometimes infer moral norms from descrip-
tive norms; thus, the perceived normativity of these beliefs can influence the extent 
to which people view that such beliefs are morally good. In turn, people’s desire to 
be seen as moral may drive them to behave in accordance with messages communi-
cated by the law; this desire to be seen as moral may ultimately underlie coordination. 
In other words, messages communicated by the law are necessary for coordinating 
people’s views of individuals who have received punishment. 
APPROACHES TO REDUCING NEGATIVITY TOWARD PUNISHED 
INDIVIDUALS: INSIGHTS FROM MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
As previously mentioned, coordination can be desirable for punishers because it makes 
their actions appear legitimate (e.g., Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). However, for those 
on the receiving end of punishment, such coordination can be undesirable given that 
the law can communicate that punished individuals and those who care for them are 
immoral and can never repay their debt to society—a view that is particularly com-
mon in the United States (Alexander, 2012; Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2020; Kleinfeld, 2016; 
Yankah, 2004). As such, punished individuals may wonder how such negativity can be 
reduced. Research within moral psychology has begun to address this question. 
In one line of work (Heiphetz, 2019), adults learned about two different individuals 
who were described as “bad.” Consistent with the messages communicated via the 
law, one individual’s badness was attributed to internal, immutable causes. The other 
individual’s badness was attributed to social factors. After learning about each person, 
participants divided five resources between them. Adults allocated fewer resources 
than would be expected by chance to the individual who was described as inherently 
bad and, thus, allocated more resources to the individual whose badness was attributed 
to social factors. This result suggests that messages inconsistent with those communi-
cated by the US legal system (i.e., portraying incarcerated people as redeemable rather 
than inherently bad) may, at least momentarily, increase positivity toward punished 
individuals. 
Related work more directly examined the extent to which messages can reduce 
negativity toward people who have had contact with the US legal system (Dunlea & 
Heiphetz, 2019). Here, children reported extremely negative attitudes toward people 
whose incarceration was attributed to internal badness. These attitudes improved 
slightly when the incarceration was attributed to behavioral factors (e.g., doing some-
thing wrong) and improved somewhat more when the incarceration was attributed to 
societal inequality (e.g., poverty). In a follow-up study, children reported more positive 
attitudes toward a person whose incarceration was attributed to internal plus soci-
etal reasons (e.g., being a bad person and growing up poor) than toward a person 
whose incarceration was attributed to an internal reason alone or an internal reason 
plus a behavioral reason (e.g., being a bad person and doing something wrong). This 
result suggests that providing information about societal inequalities associated with 
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incarceration can reduce the negativity associated with the types of messages commu-
nicated by US law (i.e., that incarcerated people are inherently bad). 
This work is critical in understanding how society can leverage moral psychology 
to benefit people who have had contact with the legal system. However, interventions 
such as those suggested above (i.e., teaching children and adults about the societal 
inequalities that underlie mass incarceration) are aimed at individuals, not society at 
large. To affect societal representations of punishment, such interventions must be 
scaled up to the level of the law. Doing so is no small task. However, even incremental 
changes in US criminal law can begin to change perspectives on punishment. 
APPROACHES TO REDUCING NEGATIVITY TOWARD  
PUNISHED INDIVIDUALS: INSIGHTS FROM LAW
As a first step, states can work to eliminate “three strikes” laws. These laws often man-
date a life sentence after a third felony conviction, licensing the inference that people 
who have committed multiple crimes can never improve (e.g., Kleinfeld, 2016; Yankah, 
2004). Lawmakers in the United States can curb such inferences by borrowing from Euro-
pean criminal law. For instance, in Germany, sentencing guidelines specify punishment 
“frames”—upper and lower sentence limits—for given offenses. Under this framework, 
a person found guilty of theft cannot be imprisoned for more than five years, regardless 
of prior criminal history. Unlike in the United States, where perpetual punishment for 
recidivists connotes a permanently “ruined self,” punishment in Europe connotes that 
what people do in the present need not determine who they will be in the future (Klein-
feld, 2016). If laws in the United States change to connote less negativity towards people 
who have had contact with the legal system (i.e., by signaling that such individuals are 
not intrinsically immoral, as do laws in some European countries), people living in the 
United States may change how they think about such individuals.
Change at the level of the law is crucial because, as previously mentioned, the law 
has unique coordinating power and is well positioned to reduce disagreement with 
the moral messages it communicates (e.g., McAdams, 2015). Of course, the question 
of whether repealing extant statutes within US criminal law will help attenuate nega-
tivity toward currently and formerly incarcerated individuals is empirical in nature. 
Future work can directly test this possibility.
A CASE OF “POSITIVE COORDINATION”:  
LAW COORDINATES PEOPLE’S VIEWS ABOUT PREJUDICE
The section above provided evidence that the law is especially well positioned to coor-
dinate human behavior in the domain of punishment, although such coordination can 
have unjust consequences. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, disputes (i.e., 
bouts of non-coordination) regarding punishment often track situations where prejudice 
and other forms of intergroup negativity are salient. In other words, non-coordination 
about punitive ideology often occurs in parallel to non-coordination about intergroup 
attitudes. This observation suggests that human behavior and cognition are also diffi-
cult to coordinate in the domain of intergroup relations. Psychologists have long been 
interested in reducing negativity stemming from intergroup conflict and disagreement 
(e.g., Cohen & Insko, 2008). Nevertheless, the field has experienced limited success given 
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that prejudice and discrimination continue to be some of humanity’s greatest challenges. 
Here, we argue that law is particularly well suited to help attenuate intergroup conflict 
because it can signal that such behavior is immoral. That is, we argue that the law can 
coordinate people’s views in a way that promotes positive change. In this way, findings 
from moral psychology, such as those regarding the influence of moral norms, serve as 
a necessary link between social cognition (e.g., people’s representations of members of 
different groups) and law (e.g., anti-discrimination efforts). Because the law alters social 
cognition via morality by communicating that some ways of responding to other people 
are immoral, understanding moral psychology is necessary in order to fully understand 
the relation between social cognition and law. 
NEGATIVE INTERGROUP RELATIONS AS  
AN EXAMPLE OF NON-COORDINATION 
Within the first three months of life, infants already attend to the race and gender of 
different faces (Quinn, Lee, & Pascalis, 2019). Children report more positive evalua-
tions of members of their own group and the socially dominant group than of out-
group members and members of stigmatized groups (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; 
Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Heiphetz & Young, 2019; McGlothlin & Killen, 2010). 
Adults automatically encode categories such as race and gender — a rapid process that 
often occurs without conscious awareness or control (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). They 
may have learned that it is not acceptable to say out loud that they prefer Whites 
to Blacks, but evidence of stereotyping and prejudice emerges on implicit measures 
(Kang et al., 2011; Nosek, 2007). These biases manifest in part as a lack of pro-social 
behavior toward out-groups. In many circumstances, children and adults preferen-
tially share resources with in-group members (Duclos & Barasch, 2014; Dunham et al., 
2011; McGuire, Rizzo, Killen, & Rutland, 2018) and demonstrate more willingness to 
help in-group versus out-group members (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Johnson, 1982; Levine, 
Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Sierksma, 2018). Thus, research in social cognition sug-
gests that the tendency to hold differential views of in-group and out-group members 
emerges early in life and is tenacious throughout development. In other words, peo-
ple’s views regarding specific social groups are not coordinated with one another, as 
members of different social groups favor members of their own group. 
Notably, bias against members of stigmatized groups occurs in a range of conse-
quential settings, including the US legal system. One legal process that has received 
a considerable amount of attention within psychology is jury selection (e.g., Norton, 
Sommers, & Brauner, 2007; Sommers & Norton, 2007, 2008). The sixth amendment 
guarantees the right to a trial with a fair, impartial jury. Ostensibly, one way to ensure 
this outcome is through peremptory challenges, the process in which an attorney can 
object to a proposed juror. Support for peremptory challenges rests on the assumption 
that attorneys can detect biased jurors and that, upon removing such individuals, the 
promise made by the sixth amendment will be upheld. Nevertheless, empirical evi-
dence does not support the idea that jury selection decisions are impartial. For exam-
ple, in one study (Sommers & Norton, 2007), participants were more likely to challenge 
Black versus White prospective jurors. Strikingly, this bias was stronger among trial 
attorneys than college students or law students. 
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Consistent with the idea discussed in the introduction that perceptions regarding 
punishment and intergroup interactions are often intertwined, the negative conse-
quences of racial bias also accrue to those whom the law seeks to punish. Black people 
endure worse outcomes than White people at all stages of legal involvement: they are 
more likely to experience arrest and negative interactions with police (Brunson, 2007; 
Stevens & Morash, 2015), face bias from lawyers and jurors (Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, 
& Meissner, 2005; Richardson & Goff, 2013; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), and spend 
time in jail and prison (Alexander, 2012). Moreover, individuals with stereotypically 
Black features are more likely to receive the death penalty than individuals who look 
less stereotypically Black (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006). Dis-
advantage also accrues on the basis of gender (Rathbone, 2007) and socioeconomic 
status (Eubanks, 2018), among other group memberships. Thus, non-coordination on 
the basis of group membership can play an important role in the US legal system.
COORDINATION IN THE DOMAIN OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS: 
THE LAW COORDINATES THE VIEW THAT PREJUDICE IS IMMORAL 
Although prejudice and discrimination are pervasive within the US legal system, 
research from moral psychology offers unique insight into how the law can work to 
coordinate people’s views regarding the immorality of prejudice, ultimately reduc-
ing such negative outcomes. In other words, moral psychology clarifies how social 
cognition, including that of legal actors, can be altered to better achieve the law’s anti-
discrimination goals. 
People sometimes turn to the law to tell them what is (im)moral (e.g., Berko witz & 
Walker, 1967; Tyler, 2006). Thus, one way to reduce bias is to implement and enforce 
laws that communicate that bias is morally wrong. In one study demonstrating the 
influence of law on moral cognition (Berkowitz & Walker, 1967), adults rated the 
immorality of several behaviors. Next, participants learned that some behaviors were 
legal whereas others were illegal. Crucially, participants viewed behaviors as more 
immoral after learning about their illegality. The results of this study provide initial 
evidence that the law can coordinate people’s views about the moral valence of par-
ticular behaviors. Further supporting the idea that the law can be a useful tool with 
which to reduce bias, more recent work has shown that anti-gay bias in a given state 
decreased after that state legalized same-sex marriage (Ofosu, Chambers, Chen, & 
Hehman, 2019). Put slightly differently, the results of this work suggest that the law 
can coordinate people’s views in a way that decreases bias. Taken together, these stud-
ies suggest that implementing and enforcing anti-discrimination laws can reduce the 
likelihood that people will act in a biased manner by increasing public support for the 
view that bias and other instances of intergroup negativity are immoral. 
Studies of moral cognition offer additional insights into how passing and enforcing 
a specific law can coordinate views pertinent to intergroup relations and ultimately 
affect positive social change. In a line of work demonstrating that legal changes may 
shift perceived norms, Tankard and Paluck (2017) manipulated participants’ beliefs 
about the likelihood of the then-upcoming Supreme Court ruling regarding same-sex 
marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015). Half of the participants read that the Supreme 
Court was likely to rule in favor of fully legalizing same-sex marriage, whereas the 
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other half read that such an outcome was unlikely. Participants in the favorable ruling 
condition were more likely than those in the unfavorable ruling condition to report 
that Americans collectively support same-sex marriage. A longitudinal study further 
showed that the actual Obergefell v. Hodges ruling in favor of same-sex marriage was 
associated with an increase in perceived norms supporting same-sex marriage. This 
work therefore suggests that anti-discrimination laws (e.g., those ensuring fundamen-
tal human rights to same-sex couples) can effectively coordinate people’s views about 
norms (e.g., support for same-sex marriage). 
Research from moral psychology is necessary to understand why changes in law 
alter social cognition. As previously discussed, people often infer that what is norma-
tive also should be normative, meaning that what is common is moral (e.g., Lindström 
et  al., 2018; Roberts et  al., 2018). Because people are motivated to be seen as moral 
(e.g., Ellemers et al., 2019), they may be especially willing to behave concordantly with 
perceived descriptive norms (e.g., refraining from discriminating against same-sex 
couples; Tankard & Paluck, 2016), ostensibly because doing so puts them in the moral 
majority. Understanding this aspect of moral psychology clarifies how coordinating 
views about perceived norms within the legal system can alter social cognition (e.g., 
attenuating negativity toward stigmatized groups). 
ADDITIONAL APPROACHES TO REDUCING PREJUDICE:  
INSIGHTS FROM MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Moral psychology offers additional insights for increasing moral behavior broadly 
construed, which are relevant to prejudice reduction efforts if one conceives of preju-
dice as immoral. One such line of work highlights the importance of linking behavior 
to identity. This can be done subtly, using noun labels. The logic here is that using a 
noun connects a particular behavior to who a person is, whereas using other linguistic 
forms can make the behavior appear more transient (Markman, 1989). In line with this 
reasoning, adults are less likely to cheat when others ask them to “not be a cheater” 
rather than when others ask them to “not cheat” (Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013). Simi-
larly, children are more likely to help others when they hear about being “a helper” 
than when they are asked “to help” (Bryan, Master, & Walton, 2014), and participants 
are less likely to litter when they are labeled as “litter-conscious” than when they are 
asked “not to litter” (Miller, Brickman, & Bolen, 1975). Importantly, this latter effect 
remained even seven weeks after the initial manipulation. This finding highlights the 
potential for noun-labeling interventions to effectively coordinate people’s behavior 
(a) outside of a lab setting and (b) in a way that promotes positive outcomes over 
an extended period of time. Applying this logic to the legal context, jury instructions 
containing phrases like “remember to be an egalitarian person” or “do not be a bigot” 
could help to reduce juror bias. 
A separate line of work in moral psychology highlights the role that moral realism 
plays in pro-social action. Moral realism refers to the notion that moral beliefs can be 
objectively true or false, akin to factual beliefs, and that if two people disagree about 
a moral view, only one person can be correct (Heiphetz & Young, 2017). Encouraging 
people to adopt a realist perspective increases charitable donations (Young & Durwin, 
2013) and reduces cheating (Rai & Holyoak, 2013). In the legal context, it may be ben-
eficial to establish coordination (i.e., public agreement) around the idea that prejudice 
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is morally wrong while also leading people to adopt a realist mindset. For instance, 
using the methodology from Young and Durwin’s (2013) study, jurors could be asked 
whether they agree that “some things are just morally right or wrong, good or bad, 
wherever you happen to be from in the world” and then, immediately afterwards, 
whether they think that prejudice is wrong. Group dynamics can lead individual jurors 
to conform to the opinion expressed by the majority during jury deliberation (e.g., Son 
et al., 2019), and there is some evidence that group discussion can exacerbate bias in 
the jury deliberation process (e.g., Hulbert, Parks, Chen, Nam, & Davis, 1999). As such, 
it is possible that the prejudiced opinion of one juror may “spread” to other jurors dur-
ing the jury deliberation process. However, completing the moral realism intervention 
described here as part of the jury instruction procedure, before deliberations begin, 
may mitigate against this effect. In other words, jurors who have been led to view 
prejudice as objectively wrong may be more likely to behave pro-socially toward the 
defendant and to resist the “spread” of bias against that defendant. 
Evidence from moral psychology suggests that individual-level interventions (e.g., 
linking desirable behaviors to identity, encouraging people to adopt realist mindsets 
when making legal decisions) may effectively coordinate the view that bias and discrimi-
nation are immoral, thus reducing such negative outcomes. However, for completeness, 
we also review evidence from a smaller set of studies suggesting potential caveats to 
these interventions. For instance, some studies suggest that helping may license negative 
inferences about members of the group that received help, as children and adults some-
times perceive individuals who receive help as less competent than individuals who 
do not (Nadler & Chernyak-Hai, 2014; Sierksma & Shutts, 2020). Relatedly, statements 
expressing equality (e.g., “naturalized citizens are just as American as natural born cit-
izens”) can inadvertently perpetuate harmful stereotypes (e.g., people may infer that 
natural born citizens are indeed “more American” than naturalized citizens, Chestnut & 
Markman, 2018). Therefore, the identity-linked interventions recommended above may 
be most effective if they focus jurors’ attention on themselves rather than on defendants. 
For instance, asking jurors to “be an egalitarian person,” as suggested above, may be 
more effective than encouraging jurors to help defendants by rendering an egalitarian 
verdict or reminding them that stereotypes about defendants are inaccurate.  
Important questions may also arise about the external validity of the types of interven-
tions proposed here. Bias-reduction interventions sometimes have short-lasting effects, 
some lasting less than a day (e.g., Lai et al., 2016). The positive outcomes brought about 
by the aforementioned interventions may follow a similar pattern (though see Miller 
et al., 1975, for a notable exception). To ensure efficacy, one possibility is to administer 
the intervention immediately before a crucial decision point in the legal process (e.g., 
immediately before jurors begin deliberations or render a verdict; Carter, Onyeador, 
& Lewis, 2020). Moreover, the extent to which the effects demonstrated by interven-
tions conducted in tightly controlled experimental settings replicate in other contexts is 
unclear. Some effects of identity-linked language are relatively small (e.g., Bryan et al., 
2013). Therefore, it is possible that interventions—at least those using noun labels to 
reduce immoral behavior—may exert a weaker effect on behavior in everyday contexts 
where situations are less tightly controlled. Nevertheless, some evidence points to the 
possible efficaciousness of such interventions. For instance, reminding US citizens to 
“be a voter” increased actual voter turnout in two statewide elections (Bryan, Wal-
ton, Rogers, & Dweck, 2011), demonstrating the efficacy of identity-linked language 
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outside the lab. Additional work remains to be done to clarify how linking morally 
relevant behavior to personal identity might alter behavior outside of a lab context, 
including within the legal system.
ADDITIONAL APPROACHES TO REDUCING PREJUDICE:  
INSIGHTS FROM LAW 
The individual-level interventions proposed above form only one component of an 
effective strategy to promote equality before the law. Many issues of discrimination are 
structural in nature, and individual-level interventions are not sufficient to eradicate 
them. The most effective solutions to societal problems occur at the societal level. One 
such solution is for the legal system to become more astute regarding which behaviors 
it criminalizes and how it enforces its statutes. For example, removing federal criminal 
penalties for marijuana possession would reduce the need to fight juror discrimination 
in those cases, as people found in possession of marijuana would no longer be tried in 
courts. Such an approach could be particularly helpful in reducing group-based bias 
in the legal system, as Black and Latinx people are currently more likely to become 
involved in this system for drug possession despite using drugs at rates similar to 
those of Whites (Alexander, 2012; Forman, 2017). As another example, and related to 
the discussion above regarding the possible influence of anti-discrimination laws on 
reductions in discriminatory behavior, the legal system could add and enforce addi-
tional penalties against group-based discrimination. Such steps could include rein-
stating legislation barring racial discrimination in voting (i.e., the Voting Rights Act), 
adopting protections for transgender individuals, and ensuring that people are not 
barred from entering the United States on the basis of religion and other protected 
group memberships, among other possibilities. 
The main point here is that structural change does not simply involve adding or 
removing penalties but rather discerning which actions should be penalized and 
which should not. Because the contributions of moral psychology constitute a main 
focus of this article, our emphasis has been on specific interventions backed by evi-
dence from this field—and because psychology as a field is designed to focus on 
the individual psyche, these interventions work to coordinate individuals’ views in 
hopes of reducing bias on a group level. Such interventions can be beneficial, par-
ticularly when their implementation is sensitive to their limitations (e.g., when they 
are administered immediately before an important decision point in recognition of 
the fact that effects may wear off soon after participants complete the intervention). 
Indeed, such interventions may be particularly necessary because changing legis-
lation takes time and legislator buy-in. Individual-level interventions can provide 
needed relief while waiting for structural-level changes, but the root of negative 
intergroup relations runs deeper than bias stemming from individual and interper-
sonal processes. Thus, individual-level interventions should precede and potentially 
be used in combination with—not instead of—legislative reform and other structural 
solutions. Of course, reducing such negative outcomes is desirable in the legal con-
text given that it is a context where lives hang in the balance; nevertheless, the ben-
efits conferred by the interventions highlighted in this section may also generalize to 
domains outside the legal context.
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CONCLUSIONS
Using the example of the US legal system, we argued that law can be an effective 
means to coordinate diverse views regarding punishment and intergroup relations. In 
so doing, we showed how coordination can impede justice (e.g., by promoting public 
consensus that the people the law punishes are irredeemably bad) as well as advance 
justice (e.g., by promoting anti-discrimination norms). Such coordination relies on 
moral cognition and behavior. For instance, law shapes social cognition both by com-
municating that people who have had contact with the legal system are immoral and 
by convincing the public, sometimes over long periods of time, that discrimination is 
immoral. Insights from moral psychology can also connect social cognition and law 
by suggesting effective interventions to further the law’s egalitarian aims. Ultimately, 
findings from moral psychology—together with structural reform—can help create a 
world where all persons are indeed equal before the law. 
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